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1.  Summary and General Recommendations
In many respects, Chile is a prototype for Latin America’s next economic stage. An early
reformer, Chile has left behind the most traditional macroeconomic maladies of the
emerging world. It has made significant progress in its regulatory and supervisory
framework and, at times, it has been a leader beyond Latin American boundaries in
allowing private sector co-participation in a wide array of ex-public sector activities. Its
good lessons for the region are plentiful, many of which are discussed in the companion
papers in this project (see Caballero 2000a, 2000b, and 2000c).  This report, however, is
concerned with the structural sources of volatility that remain in the Chilean economy.
The sudden and sharp crisis experienced by Chile at the end of 1990s, after a
decade of stellar performance, has brought about great anxiety not only to Chileans but
also to regional policymakers who used to see in Chile’s stability the eventual reward for
their respective reformist efforts. But the truth is that the reward of successful reforms
need not come in the form of a dramatic decline in economic fluctuations, at least in the
short to medium run.
1  An advanced developing economy is still fragile, as Asia has so
vividly shown recently, and as Chile is demonstrating today in a less dramatic but still
costly fashion. The combination of the fast pace required by dynamic growth and
restructuring, the unbalanced degree of development of different institutions and markets,
and the still limited range of precautionary options, makes for a delicate and potentially
volatile scenario.
2’
3  One of the main goals of this report is to identify some of these
imbalances and shortages.
The other main goal is to propose remedies to these problems. Unfortunately,
even if these problems are correctly identified, fixing them is not an easy task in an
                                               
1 See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999) and Aghion et al. (1999) for models where the correlation
between financial development and economic stability is non-monotonic. Importantly, however, welfare is
monotonically increasing with respect to institutional and financial development.
2 It does seem, however, that the rewards of successful reforms do come in the form of high average
growth, a decline in the frequency of crises (although these can be deep), and an increase in the speed at
which the economy recovers from such crises.
3 The serious decline in electricity provision in Chile during the last year, primarily due to a severe drought,
is a symbolic example of the lack of precautionary options. Shocks that compromise a single “pipeline”–be
it electricity distribution, financial services, or a road–have deep impacts. Precautionary options and the
ability to handle complex scenarios are luxury goods whose rewards come precisely on the form of tamed
volatility.6
advanced developing economy. While institutional underdevelopment in certain areas
typically leads to distortions which justify second best policies, the distance from
“efficiency” is short enough that it may be worthwhile to avoid them if they are to slow
down significantly the institutional developments that are required to achieve the “first
best.”
4  This report tries to take this constraint into consideration.
Although ahead of the Latin American pack, Chile still suffers from (a)  weak
international financial links and excess sensitivity to external conditions. Closing this gap
ought to have top priority. But this is not the only structural problem behind Chile’s
vulnerability. There are at least three domestic factors which leverage external shocks:
(b) a Central Bank mandate that, while reasonable on average, is ill-designed to deal
with terms of trade shocks and their impact on external financial conditions;
  (c) a
propensity to waste scarce liquidity in the banking system;  and (d)  a still limited
development of financial markets, particularly for medium and small size firms (PYMES
as they are known by their acronym in Spanish).
 5
In a nutshell, and in conjunction with the deficiencies highlighted above, this
report contains policy recommendations on four general items:
1)  Improve external financial links and reduce direct exposure to external shocks. In
addition to dealing with the domestic problems mentioned in this report, which are in
themselves conducive to fragile international financial links, there are at least seven
slightly more specific recommendations and considerations:
a)  Continue the process of adoption of international standards on contractual
enforcement, disclosure, corporate governance, and financial supervision. Chile
has made substantial progress on most of these aspects, but structural problems
make it very hard to improve much on corporate governance (especially
concentration of ownership) without further integration with international
                                               
4 This is less of a dilemma for less advanced economies, since avoiding these second best policies leaves
the economy too exposed, and for far too long, to justify such action on the grounds of its potential long run
contribution to institutional development.
5 See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999a) for a model of the negative dynamic interactions between weak
international financial links and underdeveloped domestic financial markets.7
financial markets. The (two-way) synergies between corporate governance and
integration are substantial.
b)  Contract international insurance and credit lines on terms of trade shocks,
although this requires a concerted effort by countries exposed to these risks and
potential insurers to create the appropriate markets.
6
c)  Foster the direct relationship between in-home foreign banks and the PYMEs.
d)  Facilitate the residence of recognized international market makers. This may
require liberalizing further the short-term capital account.
e)  If the short-term capital account is not liberalized, at the very least taxes on short-
term capital movements should be made contingent (procyclical) on terms of
trade.
f)  Homogenize domestic and foreign corporate and public bonds, and provide




g)  Further relax the rating constraints on the companies placing American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and other instruments abroad, but seek an alternative
reward for the achievement of a high international credit rating.
2)  Mold terms of trade contingencies into anti-cyclical policies. In particular, consider:
a)  Design an automatic fiscal policy component that behaves  procyclically with
respect to terms of trade.
9
b)  This is yet another reason to contract the insurance and credit lines mentioned
above.
c)  The Central Bank should supplement its new flexible exchange rates system with
an explicit (mostly non-discretionary) and aggressive reserve management policy
contingent on terms of trade. Exceptionally low terms of trade should
                                               
6 The similarities with “catastrophe risk” insurance are worth exploring.
7 Unhedged means that there is no domestic counterpart selling the hedge to foreigners, with the exception,
perhaps, of export companies.
8 As of 1998, Chilean companies are permitted to do so. The point here is to go beyond that and foster it.
9 It is important to think of this policy as one in a broader policy package that also involves the Central
Bank and other institutions. It is better to decide these issues ex-ante rather than in the middle of a crisis,
when “prisoner’s dilemma” outcomes are highly likely. Arguably, Chile suffered from some of this
problem during the current crisis.8
automatically lead to substantial reserves use by the Central Bank; otherwise there
is no need to accumulate costly reserves.
d)  The mandate of the Central Bank should also be contingent on terms of trade:
During times of depressed terms of trade, the current account should be the net of
the income effect of terms of trade and the inflationary target should be made on
nontradables inflation alone.
10
e)  If credibility is perceived to be a serious problem, which I do not perceive it to be,
the Central Bank could consider appointing an international supervisory board.
3)  Improve liquidity aggregation through and within the banking sector during crises.
To this effect, consider:
a)  Allowing for contingent capital adequacy and reserves ratios. These should be
lowered, possibly with a lag to match the systemic rise in non-performing loans,
as terms of trade deteriorate.
11 More specifically, loans to  PYMES could be
penalized less in these ratios’ calculations, while the opposite could apply to
consumption loans.
b)  Improving the functioning of the interbank market and the banks’ access to short
term resources. Opening the capital account for very short-term repo-operations
should help.
4)  Improve the liquidity and immediacy of domestic financial instruments. There are
least four measures that, in conjunction with many of the measures mentioned above,
should help achieve this goal:
a)  Foster the residence of international market makers. Since the Chilean market is
small, it may be necessary to allow trades of good quality instruments from other
emerging markets in the Chilean stock and debt markets.
                                               
10 In fact, currently the Central Bank’s mandate does consider the current account at “normal” terms of
trade, but it is not clear at all from the Central Bank’s behavior whether it indeed is willing to tolerate large
transitory current account deficits even when the source behind them is a transitory decline in terms of
trade.  It is not clear either, whether it could do so given external conditions. This is the reason, again, to
think of this as one measure within a broader package.
11 Any additional risk of a run that could arise from such strategy could be explicitly insured by, e.g., the
Central Bank. It is also important to highlight that during the current crisis banks increased rather than
decreased their capital adequacy ratios. This seems to have been particularly pronounced in foreign banks.
It is important to identify the structural factors accounting for such differences and, if needed, establish
mechanisms to offset their systemic consequences.9
b)  Conversely, facilitate and subsidize the placement of ADRs or their equivalent. In
order to make these more liquid, it may be necessary to bundle several small and
medium size companies on each issuance. If this is so, there must be a mechanism
in place to limit free-riding problems among the bundled companies.
c)  Similarly, develop a domestic corporate debt market with homogeneous
instruments.
d)  Allow pension fund administrators (abbreviated to AFPs in Spanish) to invest in
lower rated domestic instruments, especially at times when foreign financial
markets tighten.
The rest of this report supports these recommendations and diagnosis when
possible given the data available, it highlights their conjectural nature in others, and in
some cases it hints at the research needed to make these conjectures more precise.10
2. The Facts and Mechanisms
2.1 Aggregate Volatility
Figure 1: Growth and Volatility





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: preliminary data used for 1998 and predicted data for 1999. Panel (a): For the 1982-85, the average rate of growth was 2.1%,
while from 1976 to 1981 and from 1986 to 1999 was 6.8%.
Source: INE and Banco Central de Chile.
Figure 1 divides the last three decades into three sub-periods, delimited by
vertical lines: the pre-debt crisis, the distress following that crisis, and the period that
followed the new wave of reforms begun in 1986. The last coincided with a sustained
recovery in copper prices and was further bolstered by the implementation of the Brady
Plan at the end of the decade and the ensuing return of capital flows to Latin America.
Panel (a) reports the rate of  GDP growth in Chile over the three periods, in
deviation from its average rate of growth for the whole period, 5.2%. The success of the
post-1986 period, occasionally referred as the “Chilean miracle,” is apparent. Not only
were the pre-debt crisis growth rates recovered and even exceeded at times,  but11
unemployment fell steadily (panel b). By the 1990s, aggregate expenditure was in full
recovery, indeed outpacing GDP growth (panel c). Inflation, which was never fully tamed
before the debt crisis and which had regained strength during the crisis, declined steadily
throughout the post-1986 period, with the exception of the inflationary pressure resulting
from the political cycle at the end of the military regime (panel d). Real volatility did not
vanish, nonetheless, a phenomenon expressed most dramatically during the severe current
crisis (see all panels) and in occasional real interest rate surges (panel d).
Figure 2 focuses on the post-1986 period, which is the main concern of this
report. Panel (a) reports the detrended IMACEC, a comprehensive cyclical indicator for
the Chilean economy.
12 There are three periods of interest highlighted by this series: the
growth recession of 1990 that followed the contractionary policies aimed at halting the
inflationary rebirth inherited from the political cycle, the 1995 recession that did not
happen while the region was being battered by the “tequila” crisis, and the sharp current
recession.
These are the episodes that generate most of the information used in this report.
Panel (b) depicts the path of the real exchange rate throughout this period (a decline
represents an appreciation). After an initial phase of planned real depreciations, and faced
with large capital inflows and expanding domestic expenditure, the original
competitiveness-maintenance goal became difficult to sustain without paying large
inflationary costs, hence a real appreciation ensued until the recent crisis, when
appreciation slowed down and eventually began turning around.
                                               
12 IMACEC is the Indicador Mensual de Actividad Economica, a Laspeyres index of monthly production
including all sectors of activity, weighted according to the input-output matrix of 1986.12







































































































































































































































































Notes: Panel (a): log of seasonally adjusted series without trend (3 –month MA).
Source: INE and Banco Central de Chile.
The next subsections describe and document what I view as the main structural
factors behind the Chilean business cycle.
2.2 Weak International Financial Links and Excess Sensitivity with Respect to Terms
of Trade Shocks
The relatively small size of emerging economies’ current account deficits is a perennial
symptom of their limited access to international capital markets. In some cases,
international financial constraints are binding most of the time, determining the current
account directly. In others, as is often the case with Chile, while the international
constraint is not binding, domestic policies are undertaken to prevent changes from
happening in an abrupt and uncontrolled fashion. Actual or latent, however, the first order
observable implication is similar: international borrowing is limited.
From the point of view of aggregate volatility, however, it is not only the level but
also the fragility in this limited access that is important. Fragility arises primarily from
changes in international financial markets attitudes toward emerging markets (justified or
not), and from declines in the perceptions about the economic conditions in the country
itself. It is the latter which seems to dominate–although it interacts with the former (see
below)–in modern-Chile, as its business cycle has strikingly strong connections to the13
price of copper, its main export product, violating basic principles of smoothing through
international financial markets.
13
Panel (a) in Figure 3 plots the paths of the spot price of copper (London Metal
Exchange) and quarterly GDP growth. The resemblance is stark, with the only important
exception being the 1990 growth slowdown and its recovery episode, which had a purely
domestic origin (see below). Panel (b) documents the excessive sensitivity of Chile’s
GDP response to copper prices by plotting the annuity value of the expected present
value impact of the decline in copper prices as a share of GDP.
14 It is apparent from this
figure (the different scales in the axes, in particular) that fluctuations in GDP are an order
of magnitude larger than a smoothing model would dictate.
15  Panel (c) reinforces this
conclusion by plotting the mildly volatile annuity volatile next to the much more volatile
pure flow-income effect (as a fraction of GDP) of price fluctuations. Moreover, it is the
latter that has fluctuations of more or less the same order of magnitude as those of GDP.
Finally, the loop in panel (d) summarizes the figure. It confirms both the strong positive
correlation between growth and copper innovations, as well as the “excessive” response
of the former.
                                               
13 During the late 1990s, Copper exports accounted for about 40 percent of Chilean exports, which is
equivalent to about 9 percent of its GDP. Chile has a Copper Stabilization Fund (FEC in Spanish) aimed
primarily at stabilizing fiscal revenues: At the beginning of each year the Budget Office sets a “reference”
price; withdrawals or deposits are made quarterly as a step-function of the deviation between actual and
reference prices. In practice, the largest yearly net deposit to the fund occurred in 1995 and amounted to
5% percent of fiscal revenues, when the price of copper exceeded by 22% its average in the 1985/99
period. The largest yearly net withdrawal occurred in 1998 and amounted to around 1.5%  percent of
revenue when the copper price was 36% below the average.
14 The present value effect is computed assuming an autoregressive process of the fourth order–AR(4)–
process for the spot price of copper, a constant growth rate for copper production (7%) and a fixed discount
rate (7.5%).
15 The price of copper has trends and cycles at different frequencies, some of which are persistent (see
Marshall and Silva, 1998). But there seems to be no doubt that the sharp decline in the price of copper
during the current crisis was mostly the result of a transitory demand shock brought about by the Asian
crisis. As the latter economies have begun recovering, so has the price of copper. I would argue that
conditional on the information that the current shock was a transitory demand shock, the univariate process,
used to estimate the present value impact of the decline in the price of copper in Figure 3, overestimates the
extent of this decline. The lower decline in future prices is consistent with this view. The variance of the
spot price is six times the variance of 15-months-forward futures prices. Moreover, the expectations
computed from the AR process track reasonably well the expectations implicit in futures markets, except at
the very end, when liquidity premia considerations may have come into play.14
Figure 3: Excess Sensitivity
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Sources: growth from IFS, copper prices (London Metal Exchange) from Datastream, copper exports from Min. de Hacienda.
Panel b construction: see notes 14 and 15.
Figure 4 offers a cross-sectional dimension to the excess-sensitivity problem.
Panels (a) and (b) report the paths of GDP growth and the price of their primary export
for Norway and Australia, respectively. These are countries that, while more advanced
than Chile, also have their exports concentrated in a few commodities.
16 It is apparent
from this figure that they do not experience nearly as much correlation between the price
of their primary exports and their respective rates of growth as Chile does. This further
emphasizes the “excessive” nature of Chile’s response to copper prices.
                                               
16 For Australia, coal represents a bit more than 10 percent of exports and, together with wheat and wool,
this share rises to around 20 percent.  Very significantly for this report’s comparisons, all these countries’
terms of trade were severely hurt by the sequel of crises starting in mid-1997.15
Figure 4: Terms of Trade Shocks in Australia and Norway
































































































































Source: IFS. Oil Price (Brent) from Datastream.
Why does Chilean economic activity respond so strongly to the price of copper?
In my view, the fundamental problem is one of weak links to international financial
markets, which the rest of this section helps document. Domestic factors are not absent
either, as these amplify the impact of external constraints and, through policies aimed at
preventing an abrupt encounter with these constraints, lead to “precautionary” recessions.
These domestic factors are discussed in the next sections.
Panel (a) in Figure 5 shows in bars the current account deficit and capital flows.
Unlike what one would expect from standard smoothing arguments, the  positive
correlation between these and the price of copper is clear. There are two interesting
exceptions to these correlations. The first one was during the recession of 1990, when
capital flows were high, matching the high copper price, but the current account was not.
The second one was during the “tequila” crisis in 1995, when the price of copper was
high but neither the current account deficit nor the capital flows were. The first of these
reflects a domestically induced recession, as it resulted from the monetary tightening
implemented at the beginning of the new government to offset the inflationary pressures
of the preceding political cycle. Capital flows remained high but ultimately led to the
accumulation of international reserves rather than financing a current account deficit. The
second episode, that of 1995, is interesting because it shows how despite the large
international credit crunch experienced by emerging economies–indicated by the spreads16
reported in panel (b)–the high copper price gave the Chilean economy enough “liquidity”
to ride out the crisis and experience fast domestic growth. In fact, panel (c), which plots
not only the current account but also the current account net of the income effect of terms
of trade, shows that during 1995 the economy used a large fraction of the “liquidity”
given by the high price of copper to offset the decline in capital inflows; the current
account deficit at normal prices reached its highest level during that year.
Figure 5: External Conditions






























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: INE and Banco Central de Chile. Panel (b): Latin is average of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela spreads on Brady
bonds sovereign debt. For Chile spread on corporate debt (Enersis).
Most importantly, exactly the opposite has occurred during the current crisis: The
price of copper plummeted (erasing Chile’s liquidity) at the precise time that international
financial markets tightened. The Asian crisis and its sequels hit Chile with a dreadful17
combination of low liquidity and limited external financial resources (which triggered a
precautionary response by the Central Bank as well; see below).
17
Figure 6 illustrates yet another, albeit more conjectural, dimension of the weak
and volatile international financial links. Panel (a) uses U.S. stock returns data to
illustrate the variance of returns over a 3-month-window centered at the indicated date.
The thick line corresponds to a prime-firms’ index (S&P100), while the other two are
more inclusive indices (S&P400 and S&P600). As one would expect, the more inclusive
indices are more volatile, especially at times of aggregate turbulence and distress,
reflecting the greater vulnerability of smaller firms. Panel (c) is similar but with a 12-
month window. This sensible volatility ranking is in sharp contrast to that found in Chile,
especially during the current crisis. Despite the fact that the relative vulnerability of small
firms is at least as large in Chile as in the U.S., the pattern of relative volatility portrayed
in panels (a) and (c) is reversed for Chile. This can be seen in panels (b) and (d), which
plot the variance series for the IPSA (a prime-companies index) with a thick line, and that
of the IGPA, a more comprehensive index, with a thin line. One interpretation of this
reversed volatility ranking is that foreign investors focus mainly on firms whose stocks
are in the selective IPSA, and hence it is mainly those stocks that reflect large capital
flow swings.
18 This hypothesis is supported by the fact that most of the disparity in
volatility arises during the current crisis, which is clearly related to external financial
factors (see Figure 5).
                                               
17 Note that terms of trades were also bad in 1993 and that, consistently, growth slowed down that year as
well (see figure 1).  However, international financial markets were buoyant at the time so this decline was
not come accompanied by a severe credit crunch.
18 Another interpretation is that the finding is spurious, as the more comprehensive series is polluted by too
many no-trades. Although this remains as a possibility, a similar pattern was observed in Argentina (see
companion report) where aggregate volume data did not seem to support this alternative interpretation.
It is also important to realize what the relative-volatility claim in the text is not about: it does not say that
large firms’ financing is more distressed than that of smaller firms during crises. Indeed reality is quite the
opposite, as concerned local banks reallocate their loans toward larger companies. It just says that an
important segment of the demand for the shares on prime companies fluctuates with international sentiment
about emerging markets and Chile in particular.18
Figure 6: Variance of Stock Returns. United States vs. Chile







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To summarize, while Chile is ahead of the region in terms of its ability to tap
international markets–as is reflected by its investment-grade status–it still exhibits
significant symptoms of an imperfect and incomplete integration into international
financial markets. Either by “fear” or by actual constraint, the fragility of this relation
makes the country excessively responsive to the terms of trade shocks it experiences.
This response is exacerbated by domestic factors, as described in the following sections.
2.3 Domestic Shocks and Amplification Mechanisms
What makes the Chilean case more subtle than that of most other economies in the region
is that, while the correlation between external factors and domestic business cycles is
indeed very high, there has been no episode in recent times where the external constraint
has come to a point where severe and immediate adjustment was the only option19
available. During the current episode, as external conditions deteriorated the Central
Bank chose to act preemptively. Inevitably, this raises the question of whether the
adjustment–and its extent–was indeed unavoidable. Could Chile have, with its now much
improved and praised institutions, borrowed its way out of this recession and run a
transitory but very large current account deficit? We’ll probably never know. However,
here I highlight two semi-structural aspects of the Chilean economy that complicate its
handling of external shocks.  The first is a mandate on the Central Bank which, while
appropriate on average, is ill-designed to deal with terms of trade shocks. The second is a
financial structure that is not prepared to smooth the normal rough edges of monetary
policy and is prone to “waste” liquidity. I further split the discussion of the second feature
into two sets of issues: those that relate to banks, and those that have to do with problems
in the financial system at large.
2.3.1 A Central Bank Mandate that is Inconsistent with Terms of Trade Shocks
The mandate of the Central Bank of Chile has two basic components: to meet a declining
inflation target and to prevent the current account deficit (at “normal” terms of trade)
from going too much beyond four percent–it obviously becomes more sensitive toward
the latter when external financial conditions tighten.   Under this mandate, the current
scenario represented the Central Bank’s “worst nightmare.” The sharp decline in terms of
trade put pressure on the peso, and hence on inflation, and directly worsened the current
account via its income effect. All of this happened in the middle of a very difficult
external financial markets scenario. What the Central Bank did, however–optimal or not–
was within its mandate; a sharp tightening of monetary policy was the outcome.20
Figure 7: Targets and Policies
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Notes: Used preliminary data for 1998 and predicted data for 1999. Panel (d): The Central Bank interest rate corresponds to the so
called "tasa de instancia monetaria". Panel e): The "normal" current account deficit is calculated using the average terms of trade of
the whole period. Specifically we calculate the "normal" C.A. as the difference between the actual C.A. and dPx*X-dPm*M, where
dPx=(Px-Pxn)/Pxn, dPm=(Pm-Pmn)/Pmn, and Pxn and Pmn are the exports and imports "normal" average prices for the period.
Sources: Banco Central de Chile and Ministerio de Hacienda.21
Panel (a) in Figure 7 shows the path of inflation and the targets. The rise in
inflation explains the tightening and recession of that year, a classic domestic recession
with no significant external factors at play. More important is the failure to meet targets
at the end of 1997 and through most of 1998. A significant part of the explanation had to
do with the pressure that tighter external conditions and a decline in the terms of trade
began to exert on the exchange rate. Indeed, panel (b) shows that the low inflation on the
tradables component of CPI had been essential in bringing inflation down through the
period.
19 As a result of the pressures that followed the Asian crisis, that contribution
subsided, although later on the direct effect of the decline in the international price of
imports pulled tradables inflation down despite the depreciation of the peso. Panel (c)
illustrates the path of the exchange rate through this period, together with the target zone
bands; as the pressure on the peso rose, these bands were narrowed significantly as one of
the measures used to deter speculative attacks.
In 1999, inflation was expected to end below target, as indicated in panel (a),
which is one of the reasons critics of the Central Bank argue that the medicine was far
stronger than the patient needed, according to panel (d). Perhaps, but panel (e) shows the
additional pressures on the Central Bank, as its second target, the current account,
deteriorated sharply in 1998 (especially during the first half). Moreover, the entire decline
in the current account from 1997 to 1998, and more, can be attributed to the direct impact
of terms of trade (while the actual current account was rising, that at fixed “normal”
prices was declining). Later in this report, I will argue that part of the problem is not the
Central Bank’s fault, but a byproduct of its mandate.  Finally, panel (f) shows that the
fiscal side followed a mildly counter-cyclical strategy during the episode, which will be
discussed further in the policy section.
The Central Bank’s situation was further complicated by a sequel of attacks on
the peso, which reached its apex during the Russian crisis. Figure 8 shows both the attack
and the instrument chosen to deal with it, the choice of which was probably constrained
by the Central Bank’s mandate as discussed above. Panel (a) highlights the sharp hike in
domestic short-term interest rates, well above the increase in the country’s risk spread
                                               
19 See Calvo and Mendoza (1998) and Spilimbergo (1999).22
(which is tracked more closely by long real rates).  Panel (b) shows the impact of these
attacks on the other “escape-valves”: the exchange rate and international reserves (here
measured as a fraction of annual imports). Neither of these alternative mechanisms was
used to the extent that the interest rate was. This is seen more clearly in Figure 9, which
compares the response of Chile to that of more advanced economies that were affected by
the recent turmoil through more or less similar mechanisms (although to a lesser extent).
It is clearly the sharp use of the interest rate that makes Chile the outlier.
Figure 8: Policy Response





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Panel (a): Real Interest Rate Spread is the difference between average loans and deposits interest rates (IFS) and U.S. Federal
Funds Rate, both minus the respective inflation rate. Real Interest Rate Spread (long maturity) uses real rates on 7/8 year government
bonds. Sovereign Risk Spread is the difference between the average of two corporate Chilean bonds (Enersis and Endesa) and the
U.S. Treasury Bills. From April 21, 1999 the sovereign risk corresponds to the sovereign Chilean bond. Panel (b): The Rate of Real
Devaluation is computed as the monthly changes of the nominal exchange rate, adjusted by the difference between U.S. and domestic
inflation. Changes in Reserves are monthly changes of an international reserves indicator computed as the ratio of international
reserves to an openness indicator. The openness indicator is average imports in the past 3 years.
 Sources: Banco Central de Chile, IFS, Datastream.
In summary, the mandate of the Central Bank makes expenditure reduction, rather
than export-led recovery or international reserves management, its tool of choice in
response to a negative terms of trade shock.  The result is a further breakdown in
intertemporal smoothing.  The fact that the private sector perceives the presence of other
options further complicates the current objectives of the Central Bank.23
Figure 9: Policy Response, International Comparisons
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Variables definition and sources as in figure 8.
2.3.2 Wasted Liquidity and Banks
The large fluctuations in the Chilean nominal interest rates have significant consequences
for the real interest rate.  Panels (a) and (b) in figure 10 show the paths of the relation
between the output gap, measured as the deviation of output from a deterministic trend,
and the nominal and ex-post real interest rates, respectively.
20 This is done for Chile and
Mexico (a country with less developed financial markets), as well as Australia and
                                               
20 While in principle only the real interest rate should matter, in practice there are several factors that justify
plotting the relationship with respect to nominal interest rates as well. For example, a sudden rise in the
flow payment associated to a sharp increase in the nominal rate may induce financial distress on a
constrained firm.24
Norway. In both panels, it is apparent that not only are Chile’s interest rates very volatile,
but that its output gap moves more for a given change in interest rates than in any of the
other countries.
Figure 10: The Output Gap and Interest Rates I




































































































































Notes: the interest rate is the lending rate published by the IFS. Source: IFS.
Part of the reason for this additional responsiveness to interest rates, at least when
compared with Mexico, may have to do with financial development. As Figure 11 shows,
Chile’s degree of financial development seems closer to that of the advanced economies
than to that of the rest of Latin America. While financial development is undoubtedly a
positive feature in that it facilitates an adequate reallocation of resources, it also builds
the leverage for a larger impact of an interest rate hike.25
Figure 11: Financial Market Development





























































































































































Notes: Data as of end of 1997. Source: IFS and Datastream.
Figure 12 thus multiplies the change in interest rates by a measure of financial
depth (average ratio of loans over GDP). The basic message remains unchanged: Chile
has both a relatively volatile interest rate and output, and these are distinctly negatively
correlated. The rest of this section and the next one tries to understand not the source of
interest rate volatility, as this has already been discussed, but why the real side is so
responsive to it.
Figure 12: The Output Gap and Interest Rates II


































































































































Notes: Loans data as of end of 1997. The interest rate corresponds to the lending rate, loans correspond to credit to private sector as
published in IFS. The pivot year is 1997. Source: IFS and Datastream26
Figure 13: Banks Liquidity









































































































































Notes: (a) Source: Datastream. (b) Source: Banco Central de Chile.
I believe a central factor behind this large sensitivity is that the financial sector at
large is not as developed as it may seem at first glance. Starting with the domestic
banking system, it appears that it does not have many good ways to muffle the direct and
rough impact of monetary policy. Panel (a) in Figure 13 shows the daily volatility of the
changes in the interbank market rate. It is apparent that Chile is very volatile along this
dimension. While there are several institutional factors that complicate the comparison of
very  short term interest rate data across countries, it is probably the case that such
volatility reflects the illiquidity of that market. Later in this report I conjecture that this is
one of the reasons why removing controls on short-term capital flows may be justified.
Panel (b) highlights the sharp liquidity droughts that took place when the Chilean peso
was attacked (particularly during the first and third quarters of 1998), as well as the
prudence exhibited by the banks after the episode.27
Figure 14: Loans and Deposits
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Sources: ABIF, SBIF and Ministerio de Hacienda.
Notes. Panel (b): the ‘effective’ growth rate is a measure of net financial flows, it is computed as the rate of growth of the nominal
stock minus the nominal interest rate.
The banks, in turn, squeeze borrowers. Panel (a) in Figure 14 shows the path of
loans and deposits, while panel (b) portrays the path of net deposit and loan flows,
measured as the rate of change in these variables minus their respective interest rates. It is
apparent that hikes in interest rates are soon followed by credit crunches.
21
                                               
21 Banks have also played a more indirect but significant role in the initial rise in interest rates, as they seem
to have been one of the main forces behind the “attack” on the Chilean peso during 1998. Although there is
no public information on the subject, the presumption is that they do so not for speculative reasons, but to
bridge currency mismatches. If the latter is indeed the case, the appropriate response by the Central Bank
should have been not to hike interest rates but to “rent” the reserves to the banks (as will be discussed in the
policy section). Decentralizing reserves holdings, while markets can still do it, seems to be a reasonable
component of an efficient international liquidity management arrangement.28
As always, the firms most directly affected by credit crunches are PYMES. In the
case of Chile perhaps there is an additional twist. As the perception that the crises had
passed and that the contraction was more severe than expected began to emerge, interest
rates were lowered sharply, to the extent that large firms may have found it advantageous
to turn to domestic financial markets to obtain financing which was still difficult abroad.
While I have no information on loans by size of recipient, it is probably the case that
domestic banks gladly took advantage of this flight-to-quality opportunity, choking the
recovery hopes of the  PYMES, which have no direct links to international financial
markets. Figure 15 shows approximate measures of the cost of borrowing abroad (U.S.
prime rate, plus a measure of the international spread on Chilean corporate debt, plus two
different measures of the peso’s real devaluation) versus the cost of doing so from
domestic banks, for a prime Chilean firm. The line in between represents the cost of
borrowing in dollars. It is apparent that while before and during the crises borrowing
abroad was probably much cheaper for these firms (especially given the real appreciation
of the peso), the opposite holds after the crisis.
22
To summarize, Chile’s interest rates are not only volatile but they have a large
impact on (or are at least highly correlated with) real activity. Part of this large sensitivity
is rooted in the Bank’s behavior and constraints, which in turn reflect some of the
remaining imbalances in Chile’s financial development. The next subsection extends this
discussion further.
                                               
22 With time, if the situation persists, probably local banks will borrow abroad to lend to the PYMEs. But in
the short run, given uncertainty and the conservative attitude of banks, this mechanism is limited. In fact,
one may think of the crowding out mechanism in reverse: it is the sharp increase in the banks’ appetite for
quality that lowers the equilibrium rate and exacerbates the rationing mechanism.29
Figure 15: Cost of Borrowing for Prime Firms










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The domestic interest rate corresponds to the financial system average rate for loans with maturity 90 to 365 days adjustable
in "unidad de fomento" (U.F). The sovereign spread is the cost of borrowing abroad of a prime company (Enersis) minus the US
Treasury Bill. The terms “rdev.” and “rdev. yoy” correspond to the annualized monthly real devaluation and year to year real
devaluation, respectively. Source: Banco Central, Ministerio de Hacienda, and Federal Reserve.
2.3.3 Limited Development of Financial Markets
While a leader in the region, Chile still has only limited development of its financial
markets. The domestic corporate bonds market is negligible, and the equity market, while
large in terms of capitalization ratio, is both selective and fairly illiquid. Bank
dependence, especially by small firms, is large, which makes the problems discussed
above even more serious.
23  When banks squeeze, firms have few options.
The consequences of underdeveloped domestic financial markets are ultimately
reflected in the economy’s failure to reallocate resources in an expedient manner,
especially at times of crises.  Figure 16 represents the path of a measure of the cross-
sectional dispersion of the stock market returns for a group of approximately 24 Chilean
industries (thick line).
24  While Chile fares better than other regional economies,
represented by Argentina here, it does not have the stability of more developed
                                               
23 These features need not be a problem for, as many European economies have demonstrated, banks’ credit
can do most of the job. But this seems less likely to be the case in a scenario where banks are often subject
to credit crunches.
24 The industries correspond to the stock market subsectors at level of disaggregation 5 of the Datastream
classification, which includes 116 potential entries. For Australia, Chile, and Mexico, 24, 26 and 20 sectors,
respectively, were represented during the period considered. Similar results were obtained when using
different measures of dispersion.30
economies, as represented by Australia. Finding more direct evidence on this mechanism,
controlling adequately for the size of the exogenous shocks, is an important research
theme, as is the analysis of the effects of financial underdevelopment on the relative size
and volatility of traditionally credit-using sectors.
25





















































































































































































Notes: Interquantile range 15%-85% (3-month MA). The number of sectors used for Argentina, Chile, and Australia  is 20, 26, and 24
respectively. Source Datastream.
This underdevelopment is reflected even in places where one would not expect to
find it, as is the case of the stock market. Thanks to investments by AFPs, the Chilean
                                               
25 See  Rajan and  Zingales (1998) for a comparison of relative  sectoral size among  OECDs, and for
evidence on the connection between this and the degree of development of local financial markets. A
related theme worth exploring is that of the composition, as opposed to the level, of available domestic
financial instruments. Is this composition very different from that of OECD’s–e.g., in terms of the ratio of
short and long term loans and bonds–and if so, which sectors and firms are most likely to suffer from such
bias?31
stock market has world-level capitalization values. The dark bars in panels (a) and (b) of
Figure 17 make it clear that in terms of capitalization values Chile is an outlier in the
region and fares well in comparison to more advanced economies. The light bars, on the
other hand, reflect a less rosy scenario. Chile has a very substandard turnover ratio. While
excessive churn can be wasteful, it is highly unlikely that Chile’s depressed levels are
enough to support a solid infrastructure of market-makers, able to provide optimal levels
of immediacy and liquidity. Moreover, one could argue that the wastes associated with
normal churn are a cost worth paying to reduce the extent of systemic liquidity crises
when these arise. This is another theme worth researching further in the context of
emerging economies.
Figure 17: Stock Market Illiquidity
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Source: Banco Central de Chile. Stock market capitalization in % of GDP. Turnover ratio is turnover over market capitalization (in
%).
Figure 18 reinforces the concern about the ability of the Chilean financial system
to handle abrupt changes in the demand for its services. Panel (a) shows the high
volatility of Chilean returns, matched only by that of Norway, which has less than half of
the capitalization value of Chile and is subject to similar shocks. A more direct, while
still imperfect, measure of illiquidity is shown in panel (b), which reports the results of
running a simple regression of the absolute value of daily price changes (a measure of
volatility) on the change in the fraction of total capitalization traded.  Literally
interpreted, it reveals that on average an increase in the volume traded, in terms of total32
capitalization value, is associated to an increase in price volatility that is about ten times
larger in Chile than in the other countries.
Figure 18: Volatility and Illiquidity of the Chilean Stock Market
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Notes: Source: Datastream global indices. Period 1/90-9/99. Panel (a): Volatility is the standard deviation of daily price changes.
Panel (b): Illiquidity measured by the coefficient of the regression of daily absolut value price changes on daily volume over market
capitalization.
With an eye on the policy-recommendations section, it is worthwhile to begin
asking what is behind this illiquidity. There are two important components. The first one
is the high concentration ratio of ownership. In an average top-10 traded Chilean
company, over 45 percent of the shares are held by the top 3 shareholders (excluding the
government), as compared with a much lower percentage for economies like the U.S.
(20%), the U.K. (19%), Australia (28%) or Japan (18%).
26 Moreover, as I discuss in the
policy section, in many cases the top shareholders are identical in several important
companies, especially within economic conglomerates. These large control-holdings are
not part of the daily market.
As for the rest, a large share is held by the AFPs, with a still limited role for other
institutional investors.  This pattern can be seen in Figure 19, which shows the value of
the assets held by each of these investors over the ratio of private and public financial
assets. While there are many benefits associated with the sound practices of AFPs for the
                                               
26 See La Porta et al. (1997).33
development of good corporate governance and the stock market itself, they do not help
with turnover and in attracting liquidity providers, since they also tend to buy-and-hold
rather than churn assets (see the policy section).
Figure 19: Institutional Investors




































































































































Notes: Panel (a): "Other" corresponds to investment funds plus FICEs (Foreign Capital Investment Funds). Panel (b): Private
considers both financial and corporate sectors. Source: Superintendecia de AFPs and Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.
This problem was further compounded in the current episode when the AFPs’
limits on their investments abroad were relaxed in mid-1997, right before the onset of the
sequence of crises. While it is certainly reasonable to argue, at least in partial
equilibrium, that such measures helped the AFPs and their members, it came at the worst
of times from the point of view of domestic liquidity provision. Figure 20 shows clearly
that the AFPs indeed used this new margin actively throughout the crisis.
To summarize, the Chilean financial markets are fairly illiquid and highly
sensitive to the withdrawal of foreign investors, which closes yet another channel to
aggregate scarce resources during distress. One of the main features of a developed
economy is its ability to handle complexity, in the sense that precautionary and
alternative options are always available. Emerging economies, even if advanced as in the
case of Chile, don’t have this luxury.  This closes the loop. External shocks make the
Central Bank impatient; the hike in interest rates is absorbed without mufflers by the





































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Superintendencia de AFPs.. Source: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras and Banco Central.
3. Taking Stock and Policy Recommendations
The diagnostic contains four basic elements: (i) weak international financial links and
excess sensitivity with respect to terms of trade shocks; (ii) a Central Bank mandate that
is inconsistent with terms of trade shocks; (iii) a banking system prone to waste liquidity;
and (iv) limited development of financial markets.
In accordance with these elements, the general policy recommendations
highlighted in the introduction were grouped into four categories as well: (i) improving
external financial links and their use during crises; (ii) molding significant terms of trade
contingencies into anti-cyclical policies; (iii) improving liquidity aggregation, especially
within and through the banks; and (iv) accelerating the path of domestic financial
deepening.
While at a general level the connection between recommendations and diagnostic
is apparent, there are specific aspects that are worth developing further. Moreover, not
only are there plenty of synergies between the different recommendations, but they also
share common ingredients, as many of them stem from the need to take the next step in
terms of financial development, within the constraints imposed by the small size of the
Chilean economy.35
3.1 Improving External Financial Links
By now, there is widespread consensus on a series of general recommendations to
improve external financial links, which can be found in most “international financial
architecture” pamphlets. These recommendations include norms of transparency and
accountability; banks’ sound practices for supervision, settlement, accounting and
disclosure; aggregate risk management; and a series of related measures and practices
aimed at improving the country’s contractual environment and corporate governance.
27
While Chile has made and continues to make substantial progress in ensuring an
appropriate legal environment as it relates to businesses, its limited size and very unequal
wealth distribution makes progress on the corporate governance front difficult, especially
when considering its natural or “structural” ownership concentration. This hints at an
important synergy in fostering a much deeper integration with international financial
markets: not only is good corporate governance needed to succeed in integration, but
integration may also be an essential ingredient for achieving good corporate governance.
Aside from these general areas of improvement and those brought about by the
recommendations in the next subsections, there are a few more specific suggestions to
improve the links with international financial markets as well as their use during distress:
1)  Chile has opted mostly for self-insurance with respect to terms of trade
shocks. In principle, since these shocks are mostly exogenous to Chile, it
should not be difficult for the country to insure part of it abroad. In practice,
these markets are very limited. Perhaps this is the time for a concerted effort
by both the countries exposed to these risks and the potential insurers to create
                                               
27 The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), one
of the largest institutional investors in the U.S., has made public that it simply does not invest in claims
issued by companies with poor corporate governance standards. (See pages 10-11 in the May 1999 issue of
Participant, TIAA-CREF’s quarterly news and performance magazine.) Among its requirements are that:
(i) a company’s board consist of a substantial majority of independent directors (i.e., no significant personal
ties, current or past; (ii) a company’s board must obtain shareholders approval for actions that could alter
the fundamental relationship between shareholders and the board; (iii) companies must base executive
compensations on a “pay for performance” system and should provide full and clear disclosure of all
significant compensation arrangements. It does not take an in-depth knowledge of Latin American
corporations to realize that very few of them would make it into TIAA-CREF’s good corporate governance
list.36
the appropriate markets. The similarities with “catastrophe risk” insurance, a
market that is beginning to develop in the U.S. and involves risks of
comparable magnitude, are worth exploring.
2)  Foster the direct relationship between in-home foreign banks and the PYMEs.
28
3)  Along similar lines, facilitate the residence of recognized international market
makers. This may require liberalizing constraints on short-term capital flows on a
permanent basis. Indeed, Figure 21 illustrates clearly the small relative role played by
portfolio capital flows in Chile. While indeed there is a benefit in terms of stability in
targeting foreign direct investment and more stable capital flows in general, the cost
may be quite large once the underdevelopment of financial markets, and Chile’s
structural lack of alternatives remedies, are taken into consideration.
Figure 21: Capital Controls and Composition of Capital Flows
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Source: IFS. Panel (a): 1990-1997 average.
4)  If the short-term capital account is not fully liberalized, at the very least taxes on it
should be made contingent (pro-cyclical) on terms of trade.
29
                                               
28 Citicorp has just announced its intention to penetrate that market in Chile.
29 Chile indeed lowered taxes on short-term capital inflows during the current crisis. The point is to make it
a contingent (automatic) rule.37
5)  Make efforts to homogenize domestic and foreign corporate and public bonds. In
particular, provide incentives for domestic firms (or banks) to place  U.F.-
denominated debt abroad.
30 It is important to make sure that the position cannot be
fully offset through domestic hedging markets, unless the counterpart has direct
access to foreign credit and currency at times of systemic distress (e.g., export
companies).  This process may require a transitional period with government-backed
enhancements.
6)  Relaxing the constraints on the minimum rating required to issue ADRs and place
external debt (as has recently been done) is appropriate. This said, the externality that
the previous prohibition tried to minimize does exist. The idea, however, is to replace
the “stick” by a “carrot”: subsidizing firms for achieving high international credit
ratings.
3.2 Molding Terms of Trade Contingencies into Anti-cyclical Policies
The two main Central Bank mandates–keeping inflation close to its target and preventing
the current account deficit from reaching “dangerously” high levels–are simultaneously
challenged by significant terms of trade shocks. The current account looks instantly
worse and, through its pressure on the nominal exchange rate, inflation increases.
Moreover, either because of the direct impact that such a decline in terms of trade has on
the country’s “international collateral,” or because commodity prices and tight
international financial conditions for emerging markets often come together, the scenario
is further complicated by financial factors. All of a sudden, the current account deficit
looks more “dangerous,” and the exchange rate less sustainable, and hence it is attacked.
The Central Bank is cornered and acts with its most direct instrument: a sharp hike in
domestic interest rates. As this is very costly for the Chilean economy, the policy
recommendations below are aimed at two complementary goals: reducing the pressure
put on the Central Bank by terms of trade shocks and improving the alignment between
the implications of these shocks and the policy response.
                                               
30 As of 1998, Chilean companies are permitted to do so. The point here is to go beyond that and foster it.38
1)  All things being equal, a fiscal contraction is better designed to handle a terms of
trade shock. Not only does it reduce expenditure directly and frees scarce financing to
the private sector, but it also facilitates expenditure switching and an export-led
offsetting of the decline in terms of trade. The impact on inflation brought about by
tradables inflation is partially offset by less inflationary pressure from the nontradable
side (more on this below). Thus the fiscal side ought to have a built-in automatic
mechanism indexed to terms of trade. When the terms of trade are low, expenses that
do not suffer much from non-smooth behavior should be adjusted downward
according to some pre-established rule.
31  Even with these contingencies built in, it is
unrealistic to think that the Central Bank will be able to remain uninvolved, as it is
the policy institution in charge of the short-run. Fiscal contingencies are better than
nothing, but there still will be some response needed to specific circumstances. The
suggestions below are aimed at further reducing the shock that needs to be absorbed
by the Central Bank, as well as improving the transparency of its actions and hence
reducing the costs associated with speculative attacks.
2)  As mentioned above, helping in the developments, and eventually contracting
international insurance and credit lines contingent on terms of trade, should be
considered. The goal is not so much to reduce the wealth effect of these shocks, but to
reduce the financial strain they generate, which is, in my view, the dominant and
potentially more damaging problem.
3)  Closely related to this is the reserve management strategy. Toward the end of October
1999, Chile decided to fully float its exchange rate. It is not clear what this means for
times of crisis, for it is unreasonable to assume that there will be no intervention of
any sort.
32 When facing the forces triggered by a decline in terms of trade, the Central
Bank may again choose to sharply raise interest rates or may choose to use its
                                               
31 It is important that the rule be pre-determined. Indeed, part of the current Chilean crisis is arguably due to
the initial bickering between the Treasury and the Central Bank on who should take the first move on the
impending adjustment.
32 In fact, the Central Bank has announced that it will intervene in “special” circumstances.39
reserves and credit lines to limit exchange rate depreciation. I believe the latter is the
appropriate action and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate should facilitate that
strategy.  Chile has an enormous amount of precautionary reserves (see Figure 22).
Further improved by the measures highlighted above, these reserves should be used
much more freely when external credit becomes tight for the economy. Otherwise,
why bother accumulating reserves? Again, a big element of contingency (i.e.,
automatic and out of the Central Banks’ discretion) on terms of trade should be built
in.
33
Figure 22: Precautionary Reserves, International Comparison












Argentina Chile Mexico Australia Canada Norway U.S.









Argentina Chile Mexico Australia Canada Norway U.S.
Notes: Data for 1997, except Norway data in panel (b) (1993). External debt for developed countries: BPS(IMF). External debt for
emerging economies is the sum of debt securities issued abroad, Brady bonds, bank loans, trade credit and multilateral claims.
External debt for developed countries is the sum of debt securities and other investment (including loans, deposits and trade credits)
according to the IMF classification. Sources: Reserves and Imports: IFS. External Debt for developing countries: joint BIS, IMF,
OECD, World Bank Statistics.
4)  As a complementary policy, it seems reasonable to allow for an explicit contingency
in the Central Bank’s mandate as well. Under poor terms of trade conditions, it is
nontradables rather than overall inflation that should be used to assess the
                                               
33 Another policy to reduce the extent of crises is to mandate individual international liquidity requirements
to corporations. This policy has advantages and disadvantages over centralized reserves holding. In my
view, Chile does not have inefficiencies in international leverage which are large enough to justify the high
implementation costs of such a policy. See  Caballero and  Krishnamurthy (1999b) for a model and
discussion of aggregate liquidity management policies for emerging economies.40
performance of the Central Bank. Removing the contingent element and targeting
nontradables inflation at all times should render similar results.
5)  Finally, a somewhat esoteric remark. It is often said that the reason to peg a currency
is to inherit the credibility of reputable international Central Bankers. The cost, of
course, is that the country then imports monetary policies aimed at the problems of
the other country, which may bear little relation to those of the “pegee.”  A strictly
dominant arrangement would be to keep the exchange rate flexible but appoint some
of those reputable international Central Bankers to a supervisory board which may
verify the goals and actions of the domestic Central Bank.
34  I suspect that Chile is
beyond this stage, but there may be others–especially international investors–that do
not feel that this is the case, and on accountability and credibility of the Central Bank
it is worth playing conservatively, especially when Chile has nothing to hide.
3.3 Improving Liquidity Aggregation Through and Within the Banking Sector
Chile has succeeded in creating a well-monitored and supervised banking sector, where
both foreign and domestic banks have sound practices and are by now well capitalized.
Even in the midst of the current crisis, they have not been a source of special concern.
Without risking this soundness, and complemented by the reserve management strategy
and the furthering of links between foreign banks and the PYMES highlighted above, it
appears that the banks may be used more actively during crises.
35 To this effect, consider:
1)  Allowing for contingent capital adequacy and reserve ratios. These should be lowered
as terms of trade deteriorate. More specifically, loans to PYMES could be penalized
less in these ratios’ calculations, while the opposite may be done with consumption
loans.
36
                                               
34The cost should not be an issue, for it must be several orders of magnitude cheaper than having to follow
the other country’s monetary policy.
35 In general, it is important to consider the policies suggested here as a package. Indeed, some policies
which are advisable in that setting, may be not once considered in isolation.
36 During the current crisis banks reallocated some of its credit from consumption to commercial loans. The
idea is to facilitate this reallocation further.41
2)  It is worth noting that in the current episode banks increased rather than reduced their
capital adequacy ratios. This is particularly the case with foreign banks. It is
important to identify whether this pattern is structural in any sense, for in that case
there may be a need to constitute further financial stabilization funds whenever a
domestic bank is acquired by foreigners.
3)  To improve the functioning of the interbank market and the banks’ access to short
term resources, opening the capital account for very short term repo-operations would
help.
37
3.4 Improving the Liquidity and Immediacy of Domestic Financial Markets
Figure 23: Wealth Distribution and Cumulative Sales
















































































Notes: Panel (a): For each decade it was taken one year that sometimes differ among countries (clarify more later). The recipient is
household equivalent. Panel (b) Economic Groups: Luksic, Angelini, Matte, Errazuriz, Del Rio, Said, Larrain, Sigdo Koppers,
Pathfinder, Hurtado Vicuna, Bofill, Fernandez Leon, Abumohor.
Source: INE and Banco Central de Chile.
As discussed in the previous section, while capitalization values are high in Chile
relative to the region, it is a misleading statistic as a proxy to the liquidity and immediacy
                                               
37 As long as the round-trip starts at home, it does not make much sense to ban these transactions,
especially when the goal is to fight a speculative attack on the currency. The fact that the Central Bank may
find its monetary policy less effective in such circumstances is a plus, not a minus, for it comes from the
possibility of a large supply of the scarce  “commodity” of capital inflows42
Chilean equity markets provide. The situation is worse in the domestic corporate debt
markets, which are negligible. Given the good progress that Chile has made on the
quality of its supervisory and legal institutions, it is very likely that what lies behind the
illiquidity of Chilean financial markets is the limited size of the Chilean economy, further
compounded by the unequal distribution of wealth. Indeed, panel (a) in Figure 23 shows
that Chile does consistently worse than more advanced economies along the income
distribution dimension, while panel (b) shows the large concentration of sales in the top
Chilean conglomerates.
Since there is no obvious way to solve these problems in the short run–certainly
not the size problem, nor the wealth distribution problem, without unreasonably high
costs in terms of efficiency, they must be taken as part of Chile’s structure. Within the
constraints of this structure, any solution must look for investors abroad and institutional
investors at home. Along these lines consider:
1)  Fostering the residence of international market makers. Since the size of the Chilean
market is small, this may require allowing trades of good quality instruments from
other emerging markets in the Chilean stock and debt markets.
2)  Conversely, facilitating and subsidizing the placement of ADRs or the equivalent. In
order to make these more liquid, several small and medium size companies may need
to be bundled in each issuance. If this is done, there must be a mechanism in place to
limit free-riding problems among the bundled companies (see the discussion in
Section 3.1).
3)  Similarly, developing a domestic corporate debt market with homogeneous
instruments.
4)  Allowing the AFPs to invest in lower-rated instruments, especially at times when
foreign financial markets tighten.
38
                                               
38 Chile liberalized investment options with respect to foreign instruments precisely as the country began
experiencing the effects of the external crisis. I believe this was a bad idea. It is not a matter of making
pensioners absorb the risk; quite the contrary, these are scenarios of fire sales, which yield high returns to
medium-term investors (see my informal remarks on a related matter in Caballero, 1998).43
Appendix: Chronology
Trends:
Mid 1970s-present: Export sector drives growth, though the sector is concentrated in
commodities and primary industries (mining, small manufacturing sector, largest fruit
exporter in the world, wine, fishing). Dramatic trade liberalization takes place, including
free-trade agreements with Mexico, Colombia, Canada, and Mercosur. Exports diversify
exports in terms of markets (Asia, Europe, Latin America, U.S.) The mining sector
represents 8.2% of GDP and 50% of merchandise exports. Investment and saving rates
are very high by Latin American standards.
1981-present: Private pension funds become important. It is not clear whether they have
helped to increase saving rates, as households’ savings have not increased. These funds
have nonetheless been fundamental in the development of local capital market, managing
around US$30 billions, including 11% of stock market capitalization. In 1996, 41% of
resources are invested in Central Bank papers, 35% in private shares and bonds, 23.6% in
financial institutions, and 0.4% abroad. (A maximum of 9% abroad is permitted.)  With
the latest crisis, funds begin to increase investment abroad. The ratio of stock market
capitalization over GDP is close to 1 (very high by Latin American standards).
1990’s: Chilean investment abroad increase significantly, reaching 20 billions in 1997.
(Mostly in Latin America, more than half of it in Argentina.)
1982-present:  After debt crisis (and ensuing bailouts), the government runs budget
surpluses. Public external debt declines from  US$15 billion in 1985 to US$5 billion in
1997, while private external debt rises from $5billion in 1985 to US$22 billion in 1997.
Budget surpluses in the 1990s are around 2% of GDP. Current savings, including capital
expenditure and capital earnings, are 4.8% of GDP.
1990-present: A consensus arises across the political spectrum over need to maintain a
liberal market economy and prudent monetary and fiscal policies.  This period is
characterized by political stability and strong property rights, as well as increasing44
investments in human capital and infrastructure.  Poverty declines, but income
distribution remains highly unequal.
1989-present: Monetary policy is controlled by an independent Central Bank, which has
resulted in a gradual but sustained reduction of inflation. In the third quarter of each year,
the Bank sets an inflation target for the next year; it has consistently achieved the annual
goal. The foreign-exchange market for foreign trade is liberalized, but restrictions are
maintained on short-term capital movements, as inflows are subject to a one-year non-
interest-bearing reserve requirement, or encaje. These controls are effective in tilting the
composition of external debt toward longer  maturities, but the real exchange rate
appreciates considerably during the 1990s. In addition, only blue-chip firms with
excellent credit risk rating are allowed to borrow abroad, though this has begun to change
since 1998.  Exchange rate policy is characterized by a dirty peg, with a reference rate,
varying with a basket of currencies, and a flotation band.  This policy allows for 2%
yearly appreciation due to high productivity growth. Foreign reserves increase
significantly because of Central Bank efforts to sterilize massive capital inflows, with
ensuing appreciation and growth in money stocks.  This implies high costs to the Bank,
however, due to interest rate differentials.  As of September 1999, the exchange rate is no
longer targeted. The Chilean economy is fully indexed (wages, real estate contracts,
financial contracts).
Prudent fiscal management produces budget surpluses and falling public debt. The public
sector is small, generally honest and relatively efficient.  Labor-market restrictions
increase, and there are minimum import prices restrictions for basic food items.
1990s: Despite control on capital inflows and sterilization policy, the real exchange rate




December: Pinochet becomes president.
1974-1976:
Radical economic reforms take place. These include a stabilization plan, trade
liberalization, the elimination of subsidies and price controls, and export-led policies
based on free markets.  Labor code reforms reduce payroll taxes and restrictive practices.
Tax reforms shift taxes from production to consumption (16% VAT), and income taxes
are cut. This period is characterized by high social costs.
1975:
September: A new currency, the peso, replaces the escudo.
1976:
Chile withdraws from the Andean Pact.
Late 1970s:
An economic recovery occurs, partly due to a foreign-financed consumer boom.
Unemployment and inflation fall, and real wages begin to recover.  Exchange rate policy
includes pre-announced mini-devaluations.
1977:
A new foreign investment law comes into effect.
1979:
Import tariffs are brought down to 10%.
The exchange rate is fixed to help bring inflation down.
1981:
Social security reform takes place.46
1979-1982:
Real appreciation occurs.  In an atmosphere of inappropriate bank regulations, economic
groups use banks for “self-lending.” High current account deficits arise, with large
increases in consumption and investment, and high external debt.
1980:
A new constitution provides for presidential elections and re-establishment of bicameral
legislature in 1989, with designated senators.  Additional features include a weak
legislature and an independent judiciary.
1982:
Overall: Expansion ends, with a large number of bankruptcies among local firms unable
to compete with cheap imports. Copper prices collapse, and foreign loans dry up. A huge
recession occurs, as unemployment rises to 25% and  GDP falls by 14%. A major
devaluation occurs. Government rescues banks and takes responsibility for massive
foreign debts. Entrepreneurial empires built around these banks are liquidated.
June: A maxi-devaluation takes place.
1983:
The regime’s popularity is at an all-time low, and a protest movement begins to take
shape.  Government responses include appointing more civilians to the cabinet and
backtracking on economic liberalization. The government is forced to suspend and
renegotiate foreign debt service, and takes charge of the largest private sector
conglomerates.
1984:
“Chicago boys” are replaced by more traditionalist economic team. The VAT is raised to
20%, and import tariffs are raised to 35%.
1985:
The government reaches an agreement with IMF, including full IMF conditionality, and
begins to target real interest rates.47
As economic growth resumes and public protests subside, the Chicago boys are brought
back, led by Buchi. The new policy is “popular capitalism.”
June: The peso undergoes a mini-devaluation of 7.8%.
July: Import tariffs are reduced to 20%.
November: The foreign investment law is reformed, with further opening to foreign
investment.
1986:
September: A new banking law expands the powers of the Superintendency of Banks and
Financial Institutions. Banks are required to pass a “whiteness” test, demonstrating
adequate capital provisions, at the end of each year.
1987:
Strong economic growth resumes.  Opposition ends boycott of 1980 constitution. Banks
and companies rescued in 1982-83 are reprivatized, and a new privatization program
includes telecommunications and electricity companies. Terms of trade improve.
1988:
Overall:  A debt-for-equity scheme is introduced to stimulate foreign investment and
reduce foreign debt. Banks’ debt to the Central Bank from earlier debt crisis rescue is
converted to subordinated debt.  An expansionary monetary policy is undertaken to
achieve high growth in time for October plebiscite on Pinochet.
January: Import tariffs are reduced to 15%, and a mini-devaluation of 3.9% occurs.
June: VAT is reduced from 20% to 16%.
October: Pinochet loses plebiscite to remain in power eight more years.
1989:
Overall: Economy overheats.
May: The constitution is reformed. Changes include increasing the number of elected
senators, increasing civilian participation in the National Security Council, and
subordinating military authorities to elected government.48
May: The Central Bank is made autonomous.
December: Aylwin, the candidate of the center-left Concertación party, is elected for a
four-year term with 55% of the vote.
1990:
January: Monetary policy tightens, and real interest rates increase by 1.9%.
March: Aylwin assumes presidency. No major changes occur in economic policy.
Central Bank begins to relax monetary policy, bringing rates to pre-January levels by
March 1991.
July: VAT is raised from 16% to 18%. Corporate and personal income taxes are also
raised. These increases are undertaken to finance greater expenditure on public health,
education, and housing.
1991:
Overall: The peso is stuck at the bottom of its band, and the Central Bank forced to
accumulate large reserves. Money supply growth prompts an increase in interest rates,
which make the peso even more attractive for foreign investors. Massive Central Bank
losses occur due to high interest rates and the need to sterilize capital inflows.
June: Import tariffs are reduced to 11%.
August: Aylwin and Argentine president Menem sign a treaty ending most territorial
disputes.
1992:
January: Acknowledging that the revaluation trend is structural, the Central Bank reduces
the reference rate by 5% and doubles fluctuation band to 10% each way.
March-October: Tightened monetary policy tightens.
1993:
Overall: Tight monetary policy is maintained. An economic cooperation agreement is
signed with Bolivia.
December: Concertación’s Frei is elected for a six-year term, with 55% of the vote.49
1994:
Overall: Government consumption growth slows. Improved terms of trade and export
growth help reduce current account deficit.
March: Frei assumes presidency.
June: Chile begins talks to join NAFTA.
October: Government begins to ease monetary policy.
November: Central Bank purchases  US$1 billion to keep peso from appreciating, a
measure which does not succeed, and is forced to lower official reference rate by 9.5%.
Chile becomes a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.
1995:
Overall: The minimum risk rating required for firms to issue bonds abroad is reduced
from “A” to “B.” The minimum amount for a foreign bond issue is cut from US$50
million to US$25 million.
April: Remaining exchange controls governing export earnings are eliminated.
May: The ceiling on AFP investment in stocks is raised from 30% to 37%, and the ceiling
on investment abroad is raised from 6% to 9%.
August:  Faced with high domestic spending growth (private consumption grows 11.7%
in 1995), the Central Bank tightens monetary policy from August 1995 until April 1996.
Annual interbank rates increase from 5.2% to between7% and 7.5%.
1996:
Oct.: Chile becomes an associate member of Mercosur, a move opposed by the non-
export agricultural sector because price supports will eventually disappear.  Foreign
credit associated with foreign direct investment is made subject to encaje.
1997:
February-September: Interbank rates are reduced from 7.5% to 6.5%.
April:  The ceiling on AFP investment abroad is raised from 9% to 12%.
October:  The Central Bank starts intervening heavily in foreign-exchange market to halt
the peso’s slide.50
December: Concertación’s share of the vote falls to 50% in congressional elections.
1998:
Overall: A new banking law eliminates most remaining restrictions on capital outflows.
Foreign banks account for 20% of total assets.  Total government expenditure is 7.4%
higher in real terms than in 1997, and the government is forced to make spending cuts of
$685m in response to lower than expected growth. A tight monetary policy is undertaken
to prevent depreciation and in response to lax fiscal policy; for several days in September
the  interbank rate reaches 50%.)  A recession begins in the second semester,
accompanied by a major terms of trade shock as the price of copper plummets and Asia
enters recession.  The resulting negative shock to national income is 3.5-4% of GDP. The
peso declines, but this decline’s effect on the real exchange rate is limited due to foreign
deflation. As real interest rates fall in Chile, with low nominal rates and expected
devaluation, AFPs begin to invest abroad.
June: The encaje is reduced from 30% to 10% to attract foreign capital and support the
currency. The flotation band is reduced from 12.5% to 5.5%.
September: The encaje is eliminated.
1999:
The real exchange rate, no longer targeted, begins to depreciate.  Import tariffs  are
expected to be reduced to 8%.51
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